



THE GLOBAL SILENCE ON RWANDA: HOW THE GENOCIDE SHAPED FUTURE PEACEKEEPING FAILURES

Marcus Daniel O'Connell

Human Rights and Global Ethics, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Leicester,
Leicester. United Kingdom.

Abstract:

The Rwandan genocide of 1994 stands as a harrowing reminder of the consequences of international indifference. Despite credible warnings and ample evidence pointing to the impending mass atrocities, major global actors—including Belgium, the United Nations Secretariat, the United States, and France—failed to act decisively, largely due to a lack of political will. This paper explores how this failure, often rationalized by the trauma of previous interventions such as the United States' experience in Somalia, contributed to what is now referred to as the “Mogadishu Syndrome”—a reluctance to intervene in humanitarian crises due to fear of entanglement and loss. Drawing parallels between the UN's controversial actions in Somalia through the UNOSOM II mission and the passivity during the Rwandan crisis, this study challenges the dominant narrative that the Somalia intervention was a definitive lesson in humanitarian overreach. Instead, it argues that Somalia was mishandled, and rather than learning productive lessons from it, the international community became risk-averse, leading to catastrophic inaction in Rwanda. Through analysis of primary reports and scholarly evaluations, this work calls for a reevaluation of how lessons from past interventions are interpreted and applied to future humanitarian efforts.

Keywords: *Rwandan Genocide, Mogadishu Syndrome, Humanitarian Intervention, International Inaction, UN Peacekeeping*

INTRODUCTION

The major actors in the Rwandan genocide—Belgium, the UN Secretariat, the USA and France knew of an incoming genocide but relinquished their responsibilities to prevent it due to their lack of political will (Caplan, 2004; Des Forges, 1999, p.175; OAU, 2000, p.78). In Somalia, the United Task Force (UNITAF) operation showed that interventions can still be a necessary and morally accepted approach but the UN through UNOSOM II used a rather different approach, interfering in the political balance of the chaotic society by choosing sides. This is besides the looting and wasting of the funds while using the humanitarian aid to reward Somalis who support the mission rather than distributing it according to need (Bolton, 1994; Philipp, 2005). Therefore, the lesson was not properly learned in Somalia, contrary to popular opinions from stakeholders, politicians and some scholars (Dotson,

2016; Maritz, 2012; Power, 2001; Weiss, 1995; Wheeler, 1996). The method of intervention, rather than the intervention itself, was the problem and UNITAF proved that. So, where should the line be drawn? Is it possible to draw out the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention using eligibility criteria as a yardstick to intervene in a sovereign state (Bellamy, 2002)? In this review, these questions will be answered by going through the actual lessons that should have been learnt and understanding the urgent need for interventions in situations as that of

Rwanda. I will also round up with recommendations on how the need for intervention can be standardized, following empirical methods to diagnose genocides and gross human rights violations. Theoretical concepts will be looked at- Pluralism or cosmopolitanism versus Solidarity, all will be looked at when considering the way forward and the need to make human rights supreme over sovereignty. The genocide in Rwanda was a catastrophe which should have been avoided because it would have served as an excellent opportunity to practice what was actually learnt from Somalia and any other previous events of killings, such as the Nazi Holocaust which played out in similar fashion to the Rwandan killings. Table 1 below summarizes the three actors that played roles in the military interventions in Somalia (Briggs and Soderlund, 2008; Buer and Marine Corps Command and Staff, 2001; Lewis, 1997; United Nations Security Council, 2002; 2003a; 2003b; 2007).

Table 1: Summary of Events that Occurred during the Military Interventions in Somalia

<i>Actors</i>	<i>Events</i>
UNOSOM I	The first United Nation's intervention in Somalia.
	The operation covered the duration from April to December 1992.
	Through the Resolution 751, UNOSOM I was created to uphold the ceasefire of the civil war and given humanitarian assistance in collaboration with other partner bodies.
	The resolution 751 endorsed a 50-troop UN Security force establishment. But due to more need, an expansion to 500 troops was allowed which later became 3,000 troops by August 1992.
	Resolution 751 established the Security Council's commission to oversee an arms embargo against Somalia, allowing the African Union to establish an armed presence in Somalia.
	The civil war got worse, ceasefire was ignored by the two warlords: Mohammed Farrah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Muhammad. There was wanton looting of relieve materials, shooting of troops, constant attacks on ships and cargo aircrafts even before docking and a surge in the starving refugees ensured.
	UNOSOM, I had been widely acclaimed to be ineffective in meeting its aim in Somalia.
	The arms embargo was a gross failure as well and a committee set up in 2002 attributed this failure, in their report, to pirates-led shipment of arms, additional sources from government stockpile in neighboring countries and from external donors.
	A multinational force established under the leadership of the US to secure humanitarian operation in Somalia, known as the United Task Force. Though, a significant part of this operation was contributed by the USA, 24 other countries sent their forces.
	Resolution 794 was unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 3 December 1992. This Resolution allows for the use of 'all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia, as soon as possible.
UNITAF	Mandated to protect the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid. The operation brought about stability and no disarmament of the rivalling factions took place and no side was chosen or targeted.
	This operation was regarded as highly successful, estimated to have saved between 100,000 to 250,000 Somalis.
	The second phase of the United Nation's intervention in Somalia which took place from March 1993 to March 1995.

It took over operations immediately, from UNITAF.

The objectives of this operation are: humanitarian aid in relief provision, economic rehabilitation, to initiate reconciliation and the re-establishment of the political structure of Somalia and the civil administration as well.

27 Nations donated about 27,000 troops for this operation.

It fell for the trap of distraction to be significantly a military campaign, engaging in armed conflict with some of the factions causing the war.

UNOSOM II This led the United Nations to choose sides, standing against the Mohammed Farrah Aideed faction. This distraction got to a part where 'operation Gothic Serpent', a special operation, was established, just to catch Aideed.

25 Pakistani Soldiers were killed and more injured, and later, 18 US soldiers died and scores injured during a raid, in an attempt to catch Aideed in Mogadishu. This is the syndrome of Mogadishu or Shadow of Somalia.

UNOSOM II is considered a failure, which caused a scare in the international community towards military interventions.

METHODS AND DATA

The four keywords, as shown in Table 2 below were searched across ten sources which include academic databases and the grey literature that have a significant number of articles with the same research as illustrated in Table 2 below. A total of 214 articles were searched based on related titles. 93 of these 214 articles were duplicates and another 55 were unrelated to the theme of study, based on a quick look through the abstract, introduction and conclusion of these articles. From the

66 lefts, 13 were published not in English, leaving a total of 53 articles finally included in this study.

Table 2: Keywords and Sources of Articles for this study

Keywords	Sources of Articles included	Source Type
UNOSOM operations in Somalia	Army war college	Grey Literature
	Cambridge Journals	Academic Database Grey
	Defence technical information centre	Literature
UNITAF operations in Somalia	Erudot	Academic Database Grey
	Google books	Literature
	Hein Online	Academic Database
Military intervention as Humanitarianism	JSTOR	Academic Database
	Proquest	Academic Database
	Springer	Academic Database
Cause of the Syndrome of Mogadishu	Taylor and Francis	Academic Database

DISCUSSION

The Actual Lessons that should have been learnt

UNITAF and UNOSOM II used completely different approaches in Somalia. While UNITAF applied a highly armed military engagement to back negotiations and enforce limited security objectives, UNOSOM II clearly chose sides, using armed military engagement as a stronger coercive force to attempt eliminating one of the key players to the reconciliation process. This ended in failure and regrets that stretched to another crisis in another African nation- Rwanda (Jan, 1998). The UN Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali was so ambitious that right from

the beginning, he wanted a strong UN-Commanded coalition instead of a US-led force and when the UN security council opted for the United States recommendation, he started lobbying for an expanded US mission that will include disarming Somali factions, collecting weapons, removing mines and training a police force (Facts on File, 1993a, p.441). This was restricted by CENTCOM to allow the mission to maintain the focus of its main objective, which is to deliver humanitarian relief supplies (Facts on File, 1992, p.951). Unfortunately, the world ignored the error in methodology-

“Choosing sides” and “over-ambitiousness in approach” and embraced the outcome “deaths of US Soldiers” as the lesson learned, acknowledging the former only on paper but weaponizing the latter in diplomatic relations which resulted to the Rwandan neglect and subsequent genocide.

Another lesson that should have been learned, which was in fact, completely ignored, is the unity in coalition that the UNITAF demonstrated. UNITAF was a coalition from different contributing nations, nevertheless, the US ran the show with utmost diplomacy as it established and maintained unity (Steward, 1992). Due to the limited mission and United States strong support, individual nations gave up control of their forces to a US-commander, while each maintained its own national command channels (Stewart, 1992). Ambassador Oakley was appointed as the President’s special envoy to Somalia with the appropriate diplomatic authority to work hand in hand with General Johnson. This relationship proved capable of blending military force with diplomatic negotiations. As written by James Tubbs, “Ambassador Oakley preceded almost every significant military move by negotiation with village elders or clan leaders using a strategy of dialogue and cooperation combined with the implicit threat of coercion using military force. Oakley and Johnson, working closely together, were able to maintain a careful balance between restraint and credibility and secure the cooperation of most clan leaders with minimum use of force” (Tubbs, 1997, p.38).

On the other hand, UNOSOM II had an expanded mission to include the complete disarming of the clans, but it did not have the political consensus to implement such a mission. Many nations in the coalition did not see Somalia as an important national interest as they were contributing strictly on the grounds of humanitarianism (Facts on File, 1993b, p.420). Taking this aggressive approach to disarm the clans was the beginning of the division and gross insubordination that plagued the mission. When the violence escalated, the UNOSOM II commanders were not obeyed by the troops of several countries. The Italians in particular, rejected the order to pursue Aideed, as their government showed dissatisfaction on the mission losing sight of its main objective (Lorch, 1993). Even the US which gave its support to UNOSOM II was not completely committed to it as US combat forces were kept strictly under American command to be used as quick response force to the UN forces. This problem meant that there was no clear line of authority- different participating forces, receiving guidance from many sources. This blew the disorganization of forces to large proportions. For instance, the US channel came through CENTCOM to General Montgomery but when the US Army Rangers came to Mogadishu, a separate command channel was shockingly created which did not include General Montgomery (Lorch, 1993). Therefore, UNOSOM II had no clear objective when conducting military operations.

Besides the lesson learnt, which is: entrusting more of the authority of any peacekeeping missions to the US, which is easily trusted by other nations and less to UN which do not enjoy the same privilege, a divided coalition puts itself more at risk to fail and even the US forces seemed divided. This disorganized mission also gave room for other problems such as: using the mission to gain more political relevance or score cheap political points by politicians. The June 1993 attacks against General Aideed which had a strong US support was believed to happen because, at that time, Bill Clinton may have used these attacks to answer his critics who were accusing him of being weak on foreign policy (Gordon, 1993). Also, while UNOSOM II staff had good intelligence as to the

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location of many of Aideed's weapons caches, targeting and planning was influenced by both CENTCOM and the White House (Facts of File, 1993, p.441; Tubbs, 1997, p.40). This is unnecessary interference on a mission spearheaded by the UN.

Furthermore, UNITAF's military masterstroke in Somalia should be a lesson in military firepower that should be emulated in subsequent killings of genocidal proportions, and Rwanda was an opportunity missed. The Somali society was a chaotic one where the militant groups almost homogeneously mixed with civilians, prompting a large part of the operations to be carried out in the cities. This posed a great risk of civilian collateral damage as separating a friend from a foe was left to individual discretion. Minimizing the damage seemed impossible since even the smallest weapons available to most Aircraft possess great destructive power. But UNITAF demonstrated advanced skill and power by using the AC-130 gunships on their attack helicopter which could detect individual targets and apply small, lethal doses of fire power (Hurley & Army Command and General Staff Coll Fort Leavenworth, 1997). With this technology available, ground soldiers are less at risk of being ambushed, thereby reducing the likelihood for the killing of the 18 soldiers, the main symptom of the Shadow of Somalia.

It is also appropriate to say that learning from Somalia alone to tackle Rwanda was out of place. The Rwandan genocide also followed the trend of the Nazi Holocaust against the Jews and there is much to learn and apply on Rwanda from the Holocaust as well (Hintjens, 1999, p.241). Though the main actors of the Rwanda genocide were Rwandans themselves, external forces and domestic pressure together with associated psychological factors manipulated the central system of the Rwandan state, factored by pre-colonial legacies and policies (Hintjens, 1999, p.241).

According to Dr. Gregory H. Stanton (1996), "Genocide never just happens. There is always a set of circumstances which occur, or which are created to build the climate in which genocide can take place. These stages may occur simultaneously or in a different order." There are 10 stages of genocides and stage 4, which is "Dehumanisation" happens when those perceived as different are treated with no form of human rights or personal dignity. This stage was already playing out in pre-colonial times in Rwanda (Hintjens, 1999, p.253). As Maquet (2018) will put it, "during colonial rule, church, school, administration and the army were organized around the assumed racial superiority of the Batutsi. The notion of inherited and immutable inter-racial differences in ability and makeup bolstered what was seen as a pre-colonial premise of inequality on which interlacustrine aristocracies had long based their claims to legitimacy."

In the 1920s, the triple offices of land, cattle and army overlord were combined into a single position, which became confined to Batutsi alone (Codere, 1973, p.353; Prunier 1997, pp.45-6). Belgian Colonial administrators created an ethnic identification system where any man with more than ten head of cattle was classified as Tutsi, while any man with fewer than ten cattle as Hutu or Twa (Van der Meeren, 1996, pp.252-5; Destexhe, 1995, p.viii). Decades later, during the genocide, the Tutsis were referred to as 'Cockroaches' (Stanton, 1996). By the 1960s and 1990s, stage 8 of genocide, which is "Persecution" was full blown. At this stage, victims are identified because of their ethnicity or religion and death lists drawn up. People were sometimes segregated into ghettos, deported or starved and property was often expropriated. Genocidal massacres begin. A pattern very much like that of the Nazi-Holocaust.

Though an overwhelming agrarian society such as Rwanda may not be compared with the heavily industrialized Germany of the 1930s, the weaponization of ideologies and military preparation, using conspiracy theories and myths to carryout killings in both cases draw out similarities. When the Hutus championed the racial struggle and established a racial hierarchy to give themselves socio-political advantage, these should have rung a bell to all stakeholders of international relations, creating the concern of another very likely holocaust. The 1990 test

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running of killings in thousands should have been the ‘threshold of patience’ exhibited by the international community to be on alert, against an imminent genocide.

And finally, an empirical approach in the methodology of stopping the genocide should have been learnt. In Somalia, Boutros Boutros-Ghali visited Mogadishu with a team of UN officials, inspected the events and returned to New York to write a report. The placement of an embargo on weapon supplies into Somalia was also carried out by the UN. All these steps were taken before the UN humanitarian intervention of the provision of relief materials was launched. This was not learned and applied in Rwanda, despite the early warning signs since 1990. Interestingly, the Clinton Administration learnt something in this regard. Just after the Rwandan genocide, he organized a high level of engagement in Burundi, using the US ambassador to Burundi, Robert Charles Krueger, in a highly public role as he warned the Burundian authorities, political and military actors against an outbreak of politically motivated ethnic violence (Bukhalter, 1994, p.53).

The “never again” stance after the Nazi Holocaust in Europe brought out a fundamental principle that evil on any group, nation or people is a matter of concern not just for that group but for the entire human family (Melvern, 2006). The former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan specifically proclaimed that the UN charters’ aim is to protect individual human beings, and not those who abuse these human rights, in other words, Nations (Annan, 1999). In this case, interventions into sovereign states to avoid human disasters should be sacred. Therefore, the lesson that should have been learnt in Somalia, as demonstrated by UNITAF is: “Intervention without Interference” is key to preserving human lives and respecting sovereignty, at the same time.

Intervention is Key in Humanitarianism

It is reasonable to understand why the international community feared intervening in Rwanda after what happened earlier in Somalia. But should the world keep still and watch while helpless humans are massacred by state-sponsored killings? We have seen how what happened in Somalia was only used as an excuse for neglect. On the other hand, if interventions are allowed based on humanitarianism, what is the assurance that the states intervening will not take laws into their hands and abuse the sovereignty of the state being intervened? Scholars have argued for both sides of this issue, as “sovereignty” and “human rights” are the key elements of the opposing sides of the debate.

Communitarian pluralism propagates the ideology of the allowance of societies from states to pursue their own moral goals. In this regard, the community builds moral self and individuals are significantly alive when they are members of a community (Brown, 1992). Michael Walzer (1990) argues that self is a social construct and multiple selves, through systematic social interactions form a moral society. He stated that this moral society should develop shared understandings and habits. But how best do moral principles in different communities resemble each other (Walzer, 1994)? According to Nardin (1983), though the international society is a practical association, governed by rules and norms that its members must adhere to, it is itself not geared towards achieving specific goals.

This ideology became a fertile ground for pluralist communities to nurture their perceptions of ‘good life’. Therefore, pluralists kick against a supreme humanitarian emergency or any possibility of an agreement to what may define an overwhelming abuse of human rights because human rights are in tandem with specific cultural context and are not universal. Pluralists have a strong stance on the illegitimacy and illegality of interventionism because sovereignty is the only protection ‘weaker’ states have over the ‘stronger ones.’

Cosmopolitanism on the other hand focuses on a pre-political individual empowered with rights by just being human, even before his/her interaction with others (Rawls, 1971), hence emphasizing the notion that a person’s humanity gives or determines that person’s rights (Cochran, 1999; Linklater, 1998). Brian Barry (1998) further

expanded Cosmopolitan ethics into four cardinal principles which gave the international community the capacity to be a purposive society with a moral agency, governing or regulating it (Brown, 2001). These principles are: “(a) all inequalities of rights, opportunities and resources must be justified in ways that cannot reasonably be rejected by those who get the least. This stands on the presumption of equality; (b) individuals bear responsibility for their actions when they harm others; (c) individuals have vital interests that need to be protected; (d) cross-cultural dialogue is possible and that humanity can agree on substantive ideas that may lead to a departure from one of the above principles.” These schools of thought have grown into contemporary debates of international relations, paving the way for the pluralist-solidarist relationship (Keating, 2013). Weinert (2011) agrees with the solidarists view of protecting the rights of citizens, demanding transparent and accountable governance, creating regulations on international institutions that often echo minimal standards of human rights. This idea was also adopted by Wheeler (2000) and Linklater (1998) as both scholars encouraged interventions.

As important as interventions are, caution needs to be applied. Kofi Annan once asked whether it was better for states to act void of Security Council’s authorization in cases like Rwanda or just ignore the event and allow genocide to happen (Annan 1999). He warned of the dangers of abusing the right to intervene for those who wish to tow that path, emphasizing on the potential to oppress weaker states and may even cause troubling division if selectively applied in the interest of the West. Global instability could result from the risk of marginalizing the UN if interventionists implemented their wishes without authorization from the UN. This statement called for a framework of criteria, providing guidance and transparency in the methodology of intervention for the international community. The roles such a framework of criteria must fulfill are: “(a) future interveners must justify their actions with reference to intersubjectively agreed criteria, limiting the scope of criticism and scrutiny to the norms and rules accepted by the interveners themselves; (b) it will most likely create a common ground between opposing ideologies- communitarians and cosmopolitans; pluralists and solidarists; interveners and their opponents and (c) the concept ‘sovereignty as a responsibility’ will be most accepted into political practice as states will be held responsible and accountable for their citizens. It will also identify the type of actions the international society could take when states fail to fulfill their sovereign duties.”

We can add a fourth, which is the dominant participation of regional bodies or associations, so that western states will not feel too pressured to willingly participate in interventions. During the Rwandan crisis, UNAMIR should have partnered with OAU (for instance) to get its 5,000 troops or even more, from within the African continent and then a few commanders from the western states can be deployed to help assist in the rules of engagements using their superior knowledge and skill. With the Authorization of the UN Security Council, backed by financial support from Nations, the deaths that occurred would have been drastically reduced or avoided. This framework may have its flaws, but it remains the first step in the right direction so that

Rwanda never happens again. Robin Cook, as illustrated in Adam Robert’s work (2000) took this framework further to identify 6 criteria that should be fulfilled before an intervention is launched; and these criteria are: “(a) interventions should be preceded by conflict prevention; (b) it should be a last resort and the primary responsibility for halting violence should rest with the host state; (c) there should be convincing evidence of extreme humanitarian distress; (d) any use of force should be proportionate; (e) it should be a collective effort with the right intension; (f) an intervention must have a reasonable chance of ending the human rights abuses. Hence the definition of a successful humanitarian intervention, in accordance with Fernando Tesón (1988) which is based on rescuing the victims of oppression while subsequently restoring the human rights that were violated” (Wheeler, 2000). This guideline has evolved into several improved frameworks, one of which was suggested by Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane (2004) to effectively intervene in “distressed nations” in a regulated manner that

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respects the sovereignty of that nation, whilst saving humans and preserving human rights. This will not be without challenges, as the major challenge faced with interventions remains the pursuit of national/selfish interests over the interest of the nation helped (Green, 2019, Wise, 2013), but it remains a logically and morally sound start. States are obliged to prevent genocide, and this is outlined in the World's first ever Universal, comprehensive and codified protection of human rights in the 1948 convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide.

Clues to the development of a good guideline can be adopted from the 1996 report that was drawn in response to the genocide in Rwanda "Lessons from the Rwanda Experience" (Adelman, Suhrke & Jones, 1996). A section of this report titled "Policy Approaches to Conflict Management" is policies on the need for *coherence* that focuses on the sanctity of borders and the rights of refugees. The Rwandan genocide was significantly affected by the conflict of coherent policy options between the secretary-General of the UN and the Security Council; therefore, this particular policy is vital in subsequent crisis management. The next is "*targeting*" which emphasizes early warning and conflict management. This is also vital in averting killings of genocidal proportions as already highlighted from our earlier discussion of the US lapses despite their knowledge of the imminent genocide, much earlier before it occurred.

The UN learnt from Congo's post-independence conflict by acting fast in placing an embargo on all delivery of weapons and military hardware into Somalia. The UN should have carried on with this lesson by yielding to the early warnings in Rwanda since 1990, to act fast. Doing the same thing by placing an embargo on delivery of weapons into Rwanda would have affected the trend of events leading to the genocide, considering how France and other countries sold these weapons to Rwandans from 1990 to 1993. The next Policy is on "*Delegating*" that will involve the division of labour among international organizations and state actors to reduce the tendency for the UN to be overburdened and/or develop rhetorical formalism as earlier discussed, which contributed to the neglect of Rwanda. This policy, hence, will go a long way in ensuring that responses to genocides will be swift, irrespective of UN's engagements or commitments at the time of the genocide. One more important element that was considered is *timing*, which is essential for the prompt deployment of forces and the execution of 'reasonably' quick procedures for UN peacekeeping.

Eight articles were established to tackle these key components of crisis management, all, making the international community directly involved and responsible in upholding human rights, regardless of the border harbouring violations.

CONCLUSION

The events that occurred in Somalia have been discussed to understand the importance and methodology of the attempts made by different actors of humanitarianism to militarily intervene in Somalia. The two actors discussed are the United Nations and the United States of America as, combined, they have intervened thrice in the same conflict in forms of United Nations Operations in Somalia 1 and 2, commonly known as UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II and the United Task Force (UNITAF). Their modes of operations and strategies adopted during operations were different and gave different outcomes. While the United Nation's operations came short, the UNITAF operation was highly successful. Despite taking place after the UNITAF operation, the UNOSOM II operation is viewed as not successful. This means that there have been lessons not learnt by the United Nations to prevail in their humanitarian duty in Somalia. Together with the similarity in event occurrences between the Rwanda crisis and the Nazi holocaust, efforts from the international community was not made right from the warning signs to avert the genocide. Therefore, the lessons that should have been learned are:

- a. The similarity of events that played out prior to the Rwandan genocide to that of the Nazi Holocaust indicated the opportunity for the international community to be warned of an imminent genocide, if only it showed interest. That the stages of genocide played out in similar fashion and a test run occurred in 1963 and then in 1990 gives the international community no excuse to neglect Rwanda.
- b. Taking the humanitarian need to intervene in a country marred with gross human rights violations seriously. If UNITAF's methodology was to be followed, the strategy of impartial grass root dialogues, backed with sophisticated military force would have gone a long way in averting the genocide.
- c. The USA should have been on the forefront of intervention in Rwanda, giving its full support for others to follow. UNITAF, yet again, proved that when the US is fully committed, other Nations will trust the operations and freely contribute Troops and other necessary resources. This was lacking in UNOSOM II which also greatly affected the unity of the coalition, leading to insubordination, uncoordinated planning, disorganization and subsequently, a resulting disaster. The US is more trusted by its western allies to lead humanitarian interventions than the UN-a bitter pill to swallow but a lesson, nonetheless.
- d. Finally, and most importantly is the lesson of interest. A significant number of the nations that contributed to UNOSOM II missions in Somalia had no interest in the country and it was one of the causes of the mission's disorganization that also contributed to the "Shadow of Somalia." Even the US, at that point showed unsatisfactory dedication to the mission. The same can be said about Rwanda. The neglect from the international society is mostly about the lack of interest with the excuse of the "Mogadishu syndrome" being a mere cover up. It is paramount that nations, especially the western ones, come to terms with the 1948 convention that it is a duty to humanity and a call to preserve lives when they send troops for peacekeeping or peace-enforcing missions. Individual interests should not come to play when this need arises and any guideline legitimizing the need for military intervention should highlight this point.

The Rwandan genocide indicated the need to put intervention into serious consideration as an important aspect of humanitarianism that should be essential in protecting human rights.

Though pluralists argue otherwise, believing it will give advantage to "stronger nations" and pave way for oppression, Solidarists insist that human rights should be sacred and sovereignty should not be placed more importantly than human rights. When humanitarianism is promptly displayed via interventions, Rwanda, for instance would not have happened. As logical as this idea is, the fact still remains that the nations capable of intervening are the western Nations and hence, a call for caution by Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the UN, for a more empirical approach with the use of careful guidelines in order to ensure the upholding of human rights without the abuse of power or the dishonour of sovereign states.

Propagators of Cosmopolitanism who believe that a person's humanity determines his/her rights are also in agreement with the Solidarists. Brian Barry further expanded their ethics into principles to make the international society become a purposive one with a moral agency. A framework of three criteria, with a fourth that I added was created and Cook gave his six preintervention criteria that must be met before an intervention happens. The steering committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, a unit of the International Response to conflict and Genocide (1996) drafted a report that extensively created policy approaches to conflict management- a result of the lessons learned in Rwanda. This report strongly supports human rights and interventions but with great regard for sovereignty. The shadow of Somalia had very little to do with the gross neglect from the international community which led to a terrible disaster that should never happen again. Madam Madeleine Albright's statement may be right, but it is inaccurate.

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