The Rwandan genocide of 1994 stands as a harrowing reminder of the consequences of international indifference. Despite credible warnings and ample evidence pointing to the impending mass atrocities, major global actors—including Belgium, the United Nations Secretariat, the United States, and France—failed to act decisively, largely due to a lack of political will. This paper explores how this failure, often rationalized by the trauma of previous interventions such as the United States’ experience in Somalia, contributed to what is now referred to as the “Mogadishu Syndrome”—a reluctance to intervene in humanitarian crises due to fear of entanglement and loss. Drawing parallels between the UN’s controversial actions in Somalia through the UNOSOM II mission and the passivity during the Rwandan crisis, this study challenges the dominant narrative that the Somalia intervention was a definitive lesson in humanitarian overreach. Instead, it argues that Somalia was mishandled, and rather than learning productive lessons from it, the international community became risk-averse, leading to catastrophic inaction in Rwanda. Through analysis of primary reports and scholarly evaluations, this work calls for a reevaluation of how lessons from past interventions are interpreted and applied to future humanitarian efforts